Contracting and reporting conservatism around a change in fiduciary duties by BENS, Daniel et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy 
12-2020 





Singapore Management University, SHUANG@smu.edu.sg 
Liang TAN 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
Wan WONGSUMWAI 
Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Corporate Finance Commons 
Citation 
BENS, Daniel; HUANG, Sterling; TAN, Liang; and WONGSUMWAI, Wan. Contracting and reporting 
conservatism around a change in fiduciary duties. (2020). Contemporary Accounting Research. 37, (4), 
2472-2500. Research Collection School Of Accountancy. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1884 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
 
 

































*Accepted by Paul Hribar. This paper integrates two previously independent working papers: “Accounting Choice 
around a Change in Fiduciary Duty” by Bens and Huang, and “The Effect of Managerial Fiduciary Duties on 
Accounting Practices: Evidence from Changes in Accounting Conservatism around the 1991 Credit Lyonnais Ruling” 
by Tan and Wongsunwai. We thank two anonymous referees, Paul Hribar (editor), James Chyz, Bala Dharan, Dan 
Givoly, Ted Goodman, Gilles Hilary, Stephen Hillegeist, Rick Johnston, Stan Markov (discussant), Mozaffar Khan, 
Tom Lys, K. Ramesh, Tjomme Rusticus, Jon Slatkin, Anup Srivastava, Shyam Sunder, Ross Watts, Franco Wong, 
and seminar participants at American University, George Washington University, Maastricht University, Rutgers 
University, Singapore Management University, Tilburg University, University of Melbourne, and at the 2013 Kellogg 
Accounting Research  Conference, 2014 MIT Asia Conference in Accounting, and 2017 Joint Seminar by Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Wuhan University, and Zhongnan University of Economics and Law for valuable 
suggestions and comments. We also thank Yuan Ji and Tianchi Gao for excellent research assistance. All errors are 
ours. An earlier version of the paper circulated under the title “Accounting and contracting choices around a change 
in fiduciary duties”. ǂCorresponding author. Address: 10/F Cheng Yu Tung Building, 12 Chak Cheung Street, Shatin, 
NT, Hong Kong SAR. Telephone: +852 3943 7750.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376476
2020 Winter, 37 (4), 2472-2500. DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12607
 
 
Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties 
 
Abstract 
We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types 
of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor-owner agency conflicts: contracting 
conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in 
favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, 
following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to 
accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), 
while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism 
increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater 
increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost effective 
in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms 
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governance 
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We examine the relation between two applications of accounting conservatism: the 
preparation of financial statement numbers in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), and the writing of contracts that use such numbers. Financial reporting 
conservatism encompasses the asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition over gain recognition in 
accounting earnings. Contracting conservatism means the use of reported numbers in contracts in 
a conservative manner – e.g., in debt agreements, giving more weight to losses over gains, or more 
weight to tangible over intangible assets – when measuring covenant compliance. Since both 
approaches can be used to resolve creditor-owner agency conflicts, the question as to whether they 
are complements or substitutes has been a matter of debate and, given the endogenous nature of 
reporting and contracting, difficult to address empirically. 
Starting with Basu (1997), an extensive stream of accounting literature has examined 
conservatism in financial reporting. Watts (2003) proposes that lenders’ demand for conservatively 
reported accounting numbers is an important driver for the prevalence of reporting conservatism 
observed in practice. Schipper (2005) and Guay and Verrecchia (2006), however, note that an 
alternative approach for lenders to protect their interests is to write their contracts more 
conservatively without relying on management-provided conservative financial numbers.  
Each mechanism has its relative strength and weakness. On the one hand, financial reports 
are updated more frequently than contracts and therefore can reflect new information in a timelier 
manner. However, lenders may not want to rely entirely on reported accounting numbers even if 
they are prepared conservatively, because of an “enforcement” problem: borrowers are responsible 
for the preparation of financial statements and lenders cannot be certain that these financial 
statements will continue to be prepared with the lenders’ desired level of conservatism after the 
loans have been provided. On the other hand, lenders can directly require adjustments in contracts 
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to accommodate their demand for conservatism. However, writing such contracts also imposes 
costs because lenders cannot foresee all future eventualities and thus cannot pre-specify very 
precisely all desired contracting adjustments.  
Disentangling the relation between contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism is 
challenging because, in equilibrium, both mechanisms are at work simultaneously. Existing studies 
so far have provided mixed evidence (e.g., Beatty et al. 2008).1 We exploit an influential 1991 
Delaware (DE) court ruling by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the Credit Lyonnais v. Pathé 
Communications case to investigate this issue. The ruling was widely viewed as having shifted the 
balance of fiduciary duties of management towards creditors and away from shareholders, and can 
be considered as an exogenous shock to the creditor-owner agency conflict.2 As a result of the 
shock, contracting parties are likely to re-evaluate the relative effectiveness of each mechanism 
and possibly adjust each type to a new level. We are therefore able to provide more causal 
inferences about the relation between the two conservative approaches by observing adjustments 
made following the ruling.  
We argue that the “enforcement” problem of voluntary conservative reporting decreases 
after the ruling because officers and directors are bound by their expanded fiduciary duties to act 
in the interests of creditors (rather than doing so voluntarily), which include supplying 
conservative financial reports. From the lenders’ perspective, the reporting channel becomes more 
cost effective than contracting in resolving the agency conflicts and, therefore, we expect to see an 
 
1 “Depending on the setting, the authors’ evidence suggests that covenant adjustments may be a substitute for financial 
reporting conservatism, a complement to financial reporting conservatism, or bear no relation with examined measures 
of financial reporting conservatism” (Guay 2008, p. 176, from his discussion of Beatty et al. 2008). 
2 Before the 1991 Credit Lyonnais case, the prevailing view on managerial fiduciary duties was that officers and 
directors of solvent corporations owed fiduciary duties to shareholders but not to creditors. If the firm became 
insolvent, the fiduciary duties would extend to corporate creditors, who could then sue for breach of fiduciary duties 
if the officers and directors did not act in their interest. The 1991 Credit Lyonnais ruling changed this by explicitly 
requiring directors to act in creditors’ interests even if the firm is solvent but is in the “vicinity of insolvency”. 
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increase in reporting conservatism accompanied by a decrease in contracting conservatism 
following the ruling (i.e., substitution occurs while a new equilibrium is formed).    
To test our hypothesis, we hand-collect 278 credit agreements and borrowers’ financial 
statement information from the period surrounding the Credit Lyonnais ruling. We simultaneously 
examine changes in: (1) contracting conservatism as revealed by debt contract features, and 
(2) reporting conservatism in GAAP financial statements produced by borrowers.  
We first investigate whether and how contracting conservatism changes following the 
ruling. We examine the use of income escalators (provisions in loan contracts which require 
changes in net worth to reflect losses in full, but only partially for gains and profits), the exclusion 
of acquired intangibles when calculating net worth, and the use of contractual adjustments to 
GAAP numbers which result in greater conservatism (for example, stipulating the exclusion of 
extraordinary gains but not extraordinary losses). We find significantly lower use of income 
escalators, tangible net worth covenants, and conservative definitions for affected firms than for 
unaffected firms after the ruling. This result suggests that contracting parties rely less on 
contracting conservatism following a shift in fiduciary duties favoring creditors. 
We then examine changes in reporting conservatism. Our analysis is an extension of Aier 
et al. (2014) who also examine changes in conservative financial reporting following the Credit 
Lyonnais ruling. Aier et al. (2014) measure conservatism with a general composite measure of 
decile rankings of firm-year observations based on averages of three reporting conservatism 
proxies (negative non-operating accruals, skewness of earnings vs. cash flows, and unrecorded 
balance sheet reserves). We first replicate their results using the composite conservatism measure 
in our sample, and then expand their analysis by focusing on specific accounting choices, namely 
discretionary accruals and negative special items. The discretionary accruals models that we 
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implement allow us to examine changes in accounting that are not driven by changes in firms’ 
investing behaviors following Credit Lyonnais (Becker and Strömberg 2012).3 
Consistent with our prediction, we find a higher composite conservatism score, more 
negative discretionary accruals, and more negative special items in affected firms after the ruling, 
indicating greater conservatism in the reported numbers. The economic magnitudes of these 
changes are significant. The results provide insights into mechanisms supporting the debt 
contracting explanation for conservatism posited in Watts (2003) and complement the results of 
Aier et al. (2014). Our findings suggest that officers and directors, facing a greater duty of care 
and loyalty towards creditors, report more conservative accounting numbers in the firm’s public 
filings, thus demonstrating that they are acting in creditors’ interest.  
When we interpret our results on contracting and reporting conservatism jointly, our 
findings are consistent with the conjecture that reporting conservatism becomes relatively more 
cost effective than contracting conservatism in resolving the agency conflicts following a shift in 
fiduciary duties towards creditors. We observe a substitution of contracting conservatism by 
reporting conservatism as creditors gain more power. 
We further validate the substitution effect by directly exploring the interaction between the 
two types of conservatism. We examine changes in reporting conservatism around the ruling and 
find that the substitution effect is more pronounced for firms that have experienced an increase in 
reporting conservatism after the ruling.  
To further understand the substitution effect and its underlying cause, we conduct cross-
sectional analyses. The substitution effect should vary with the degree to which the Credit 
 
3 Becker and Strömberg (2012) document that firms affected by the Credit Lyonnais ruling (i.e., DE-incorporated 
firms close to financial distress) issue more equity and make greater capital and R&D investments, and there is lower 
volatility in their accounting and market returns after the ruling was passed. 
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Lyonnais ruling helped resolve or mitigate the ex-ante enforcement problem. We consider ex-ante 
firm characteristics that reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two conservatism 
mechanisms: business uncertainty and board independence. Ex-ante uncertainty imposes costs on 
lenders since it makes writing complete contracts more difficult and subsequent renegotiation more 
likely (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Roberts 2015; Nikolaev 2018). Lenders to firms facing greater 
business uncertainty stand to gain more from the improved alignment of interests arising from 
Credit Lyonnais since they can reduce their reliance on relatively costly mechanisms involving 
contracting conservatism. We expect therefore more substitution of contracting by reporting 
conservatism in affected firms with greater ex-ante uncertainty. Board independence, on the other 
hand, is related to the effectiveness of monitoring of the financial reporting process (e.g., Beasley 
1996; Klein 2002), and firms with more independent boards report more conservatively (Ahmed 
and Duellman 2007). Since the increase in reporting conservatism is concentrated (i.e., the 
enforcement problem is more successfully mitigated) in firms with more independent boards (Aier 
et al. 2014), we expect the substitution effect to be more pronounced in firms with greater board 
independence. Our cross-sectional analyses indicate that the substitution effect is indeed more 
pronounced in affected firms with greater ex-ante business uncertainty and more independent 
boards.  
The evidence in this paper sheds light on how contracting parties trade-off the two different 
types of conservatism to achieve an equilibrium. In contrast to Beatty et al. (2008), whose 
conclusions lean towards complementarity (despite their mixed overall results), our study 
documents substitution, reflecting adjustments to the two mechanisms during transition 
(i.e., changing from an old equilibrium to a new one as a result of the ruling). Furthermore, our 
cross-sectional analyses suggest that substitution may not apply in all scenarios, but is more likely 
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to occur in firms facing greater ex-ante business uncertainty (where writing a complete contract is 
more costly) and with greater board independence (where the enhanced fiduciary duties resulting 
from the ruling are more likely to be followed). 
This paper makes at least two substantial contributions to the literature. First, it contributes 
to the debate about whether contractually negotiated conservative features of debt contracts 
provide an adequate mechanism to satisfy lenders’ demand for conservatism. Our findings suggest 
that lenders do take into account the degree of reporting conservatism provided by borrowing firms 
in their GAAP financial statements and adjust their use of contractually negotiated conservative 
adjustments accordingly. 
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on agency conflicts between shareholders 
and debtholders, and the relative strength of the fiduciary duty that management owes to these 
parties. Building on the investing and financing angles studied by Becker and Strömberg (2012) 
and the initial evidence in Aier et al. (2014), we examine the impact of changes in fiduciary duties 
on specific accounting and contracting choices. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sources of data, research design and presents main results. Sections 4 and 5 provide 
additional and robustness analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
Delaware court ruling: Credit Lyonnais vs. Pathé Communications 
 The Credit Lyonnais ruling was reached on December 30, 1991 and generated a great deal 
of press coverage and commentaries by legal experts. Prior to the case, the general understanding 
under Delaware law was that managers and directors did not owe fiduciary duties to creditors prior 
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to insolvency. The significance of Credit Lyonnais is that it expanded the scope of directors’ 
fiduciary duties to parties other than shareholders even before the corporation becomes insolvent.4 
 The case arose out of the leveraged buyout of MGM, which was primarily financed by 
Credit Lyonnais. The newly formed private company had immediate trouble meeting its financial 
obligations. Only five months after the acquisition, MGM secured an additional credit line of 
$145 million from Credit Lyonnais. At the same time, Pathé Communications (MGM’s controlling 
shareholder) and Credit Lyonnais entered into a corporate governance agreement that permitted 
Credit Lyonnais to gain control through the nomination of MGM directors. Credit Lyonnais 
exercised its rights under this agreement and appointed a new CEO and directors. 
 The corporate governance agreement also allowed Pathé to regain voting rights of the 
controlling shares of MGM and potentially remove bank-designated directors if the debt could be 
sufficiently paid down. In an attempt to do so, Pathé sought to sell MGM’s interest in an overseas 
subsidiary. MGM’s directors did not approve the sale, and Pathé sued claiming that the new 
management and directors were in breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to Pathé by favoring 
creditors’ interest. 
 In December 1991, the court ruled that the new management “was not disloyal in not 
immediately facilitating whatever asset sales were in the financial best interest of the controlling 
shareholders” (section ** of the ruling). The court held that “the new management was 
appropriately mindful of the potential differing interests between the corporation and its 
controlling shareholder. At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a 
 
4 Although technically the ruling referred to all stakeholders, the focus in subsequent discussions and studies by the 
press, legal scholars, lawyers, and other legal cases is almost always on creditors. For example, see Geyer vs. Ingersoll 
Publications 1992; Weaver vs. Kellogg 1997; and Medlin vs. Wells Fargo Bank 2007. For the text of the ruling, see 
Memorandum Opinion, Civ. A. No. 12150, Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County. For further 
institutional details surrounding the case, see Becker and Strömberg (2012).  
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board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise” (section *34 of the ruling).5 
 The ruling came as a surprise to the business and legal community and immediately 
triggered widespread media coverage.6 It is therefore reasonable to view the ruling as an exogenous 
shock to managerial fiduciary duties. Despite uncertainty about the exact definition of “vicinity” 
of insolvency in the ruling, it is commonly viewed that the ruling has shifted the balance of power 
towards creditors in distressed situations (Becker and Strömberg 2012). Since the ruling only 
applied to Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency, it enables us to employ a 
difference-in-difference identification strategy and compare outcomes of affected and unaffected 
firms before and after 1991. 
 
Empirical predictions 
 The conflict between the general providers of capital to firms – lenders and owners – has 
been well acknowledged in the corporate finance literature for decades (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). Becker and Strömberg (2012) note that this conflict can be 
particularly acute in times of financial distress when management, acting on behalf of 
shareholders, has the incentive to underinvest (since value gains will go to lenders first) or, when 
they do invest, opt for riskier projects (to increase the probability of owners receiving a gain after 
paying off lenders). Becker and Strömberg (2012) utilize the Credit Lyonnais case as an exogenous 
shock to the creditor-owner conflict. Their study predicts and documents that affected firms 
 
5 Footnote 55 of the ruling states that the possibility of insolvency can expose creditors to risks of opportunistic 
behavior if the fiduciary duties of directors are owed to shareholders only. It states that “in managing the business 
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right […] course to 
follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders […] would make if given the opportunity 
to act” (footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais ruling). 
6 According to Becker and Strömberg (2012), 24 newspapers covered the case and ruling on the day of or day following 
the ruling and, within the next three months, the case was covered more than 60 times by the press. 
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(i.e., those incorporated in Delaware and closer to insolvency) invest more, but at the same time 
experience less volatile cash flows, compared to unaffected firms. This behavior is consistent with 
the predictions of the classic models since it reflects a reduced tendency by firms to invest for the 
benefit of shareholders at the expense of lenders. 
 The results in Becker and Strömberg (2012) suggest that the Credit Lyonnais case may also 
be useful to better understand how accounting numbers are prepared and used in lending 
agreements. The conflict between lenders and owners affects not only investing behavior, but also 
financial reporting (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). While lenders negotiate contracts to protect 
themselves, they must still delegate the financial reporting function to the borrowing firm’s 
management. Thus, not only is there an agency problem related to investment, lenders also risk 
distortion of financial reporting by management. 
 The accounting literature has considered two alternative mechanisms that can be used to 
mitigate such a conflict. One alternative (reporting conservatism) is to pressure management into 
a reporting system that aligns with the payoff function of lenders, e.g., a model where bad news is 
communicated on a more timely basis than good news, since lenders are less concerned about the 
upside which will belong to the owners. Ball (2001) and Watts (2003), among others, have made 
this argument to explain the format that accounting principles have followed historically, with 
asymmetries in the form of timely loss recognition (e.g., impairments) and non-recognition of 
contingent gains. Empirically, a long line of literature followed Basu (1997) to demonstrate this 
behavior in practice, especially in debt contracting (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Nikolaev 2010; Tan 2013; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008). 
 In contrast, other scholars (e.g., Schipper 2005; Guay and Verrecchia 2006) have argued 
that, to counter management’s incentives to bias upwards, lenders could also write contracts more 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376476
10 
 
conservatively (contracting conservatism). For example, when measuring covenant compliance, 
debt agreements may give more weight to losses over gains, or more weight to tangible over 
intangible assets. Beatty et al. (2008) document the prevalence of such contracts in practice. 
 The use of these two conservatism mechanisms in resolving agency problems in debt 
contracting has been debated in the literature. The strength of the financial reporting approach is 
that financial reports are updated more frequently than contracts and can reflect new information 
on a timelier basis and more effectively. For example, public filings are updated at least every 
fiscal quarter in the U.S., whereas loan contracts are written only when initiated or renegotiated. 
Moreover, the measurement rules in loan contracts are predetermined and cannot fully incorporate 
new information after they have been written. However, reporting conservatism has an 
“enforcement” problem because it is the manager who supplies reporting conservatism and lenders 
cannot be certain that they will continue to receive the desired reporting conservatism after they 
have provided the loans. The strength of contracting conservatism, on the other hand, is that lenders 
can directly incorporate in the contract conservative modifications to covenants meeting their 
specific requirements. However, it is costly to write such contracts because lenders cannot foresee 
all future eventualities. Since it is inefficient and costly to design a contract that transfers decision 
rights either too frequently or too infrequently (e.g., Leuz 2001; Guay 2008), adjustments in the 
contract are usually kept very crude (i.e., incomplete contracts), which cannot accurately reflect 
bad news on a timely basis.  
Beatty et al. (2008) have examined the relation between reporting and contracting 
conservatism using a cross-sectional association analysis. While their evidence leans towards a 
complementary relation, their results overall are mixed as covenants that ignore intangibles when 
calculating net worth are not associated with conservative reporting. The inconclusive findings are 
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likely due to endogeneity embedded in their cross-sectional association analysis, since reporting 
and contracting choices are made simultaneously in an equilibrium.  
The Credit Lyonnais ruling provides an opportunity to tackle this difficult question. We 
exploit the ruling to extend Beatty et al. (2008) in a quasi-experimental setting in which changes 
in creditor-owner agency conflicts are exogenous (Becker and Strömberg 2012). Contracting 
parties are likely to re-evaluate the relative effectiveness of each mechanism in response to the 
exogenous change in agency conflicts and form a new equilibrium with each mechanism adjusting 
to its appropriate level. We are therefore able to provide more causal inferences about the true 
interdependent relation between the two conservative approaches by observing adjustments made 
to these approaches after the ruling.  
 Aier et al. (2014) also utilize Credit Lyonnais but focus on the financial reporting angle 
only. They find that reporting conservatism, as measured using decile rankings of firm-year 
observations based on averages of three conservatism proxies (negative non-operating accruals, 
skewness of earnings vs. cash flows, and unrecorded balance sheet reserves), increases following 
the ruling for Delaware distressed firms only. We first replicate Aier et al.’s (2014) results in our 
debt contract sample and then expand on those results by examining specific accounting choices, 
namely, negative accruals and special items. More importantly, we link the reporting change to the 
contracting change studied by Beatty et al. (2008). This linkage is left unexplored by Aier et al. 
(2014), and yet, as previously noted, accounting scholars have been divided on how such an 
interaction would manifest empirically. 
We conjecture that the “enforcement” problem of voluntary conservative reporting 
decreased after the ruling because managers were bound by their expanded fiduciary duties to act 
in the interests of creditors, which include supplying conservative financial reports. From the 
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lenders’ perspective, the reporting channel becomes more cost effective than contracting in 
resolving the agency conflicts and, therefore, we expect to see an increase in reporting 
conservatism along with a decrease in contracting conservatism following the ruling 
(i.e., substitution occurs while a new equilibrium is formed). We state our first hypothesis 
regarding both reporting and contracting conservatism as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Changes in reporting and contracting conservatism): After the Credit 
Lyonnais ruling, firms incorporated in Delaware and in the vicinity of insolvency 
exhibit more reporting conservatism and less contracting conservatism compared 
to firms incorporated in other states or Delaware firms not in the vicinity of 
insolvency. 
The substitution effect of reporting conservatism for contracting conservatism following 
the ruling is likely to vary cross-sectionally with ex-ante firm characteristics reflecting the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the two conservatism mechanisms. Our cross‐sectional tests are based 
on two constructs expected to affect the substitution between the two types of conservatism, one 
related to contracting and the other to financial reporting. Specifically, we consider factors likely 
to affect the enforcement costs of contracting conservatism and the effectiveness of lender 
monitoring making use of financial reporting conservatism. First, in relation to contracting 
conservatism, we consider variations in borrowers’ business volatility. Prior research shows that 
exogenous uncertainty is an important driver of debt contract renegotiation (Roberts and Sufi 2009; 
Roberts 2015; Nikolaev 2018). High uncertainty makes it difficult to write complete initial 
contracts because of the large number of contingencies that cannot all be anticipated. Since officers 
and directors of borrowing firms are bound by greater fiduciary duties favoring creditors following 
Credit Lyonnais, lenders to firms facing higher uncertainty can reduce reliance on relatively costly 
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mechanisms involving contracting conservatism. Thus, we expect the substitution effect to be 
more pronounced for firms with greater ex-ante uncertainty. Stated formally: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A (moderating effect of ex-ante uncertainty): The substitution of reporting 
conservatism for contracting conservatism following the Credit Lyonnais ruling is 
more pronounced in firms with greater ex-ante uncertainty.  
Next, in relation to reporting conservatism, we examine the cross-sectional effect of board 
independence. Prior studies document that more independent boards of directors are more effective 
in monitoring the financial reporting process (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002) and, in particular, firms 
with more independent boards report more conservatively (Ahmed and Duellman 2007). Since the 
increase in financial reporting conservatism following Credit Lyonnais is concentrated in firms 
with more independent boards (Aier et al. 2014), we expect the substitution effect to be more 
pronounced for firms with greater board independence. Stated formally:  
HYPOTHESIS 2B (moderating effect of board independence): The substitution of reporting 
conservatism for contracting conservatism following the Credit Lyonnais ruling is 
more pronounced in firms with greater board independence. 
 
3. Data and analyses 
Sample selection 
To test Hypothesis 1 about contracting conservatism, we hand-collect a sample of loan 
contracts disclosed by borrowing firms in various SEC filings. For tractability, we restrict loan 
contracts to the years 1989 to 1994 (three years before and after the ruling). We describe the data 
collection procedures in more detail in Appendix 2. The loan contracts sample consists of 278 
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private loan contracts.7 We extract data on debt covenant terms, noting any conservative 
modifications to accounting numbers involving asymmetric treatments of gains and losses, as well 
as the treatment of intangible assets in net worth measures. To examine borrowing firms’ reporting 
conservatism, we also collect financial statement data from Compustat/CRSP corresponding to 
what would have been available on the dates the loan contracts are signed. We obtain data on board 
of directors from Compact Disclosure.  
 
Empirical strategy 
We examine contracting and reporting conservatism using the following difference-in-
difference regression specification: 
Yit = β0 + βi Afterlawt × Affectedi + γAffectedi + δ'Xit + Industry FE + Year FE + εit (1) 
Y refers to the various proxies for contracting and reporting conservatism, i indexes firms 
and t indexes time (in years). Afterlaw is an indicator variable equal to one for the years 1992 to 
1994, and zero otherwise. Affected is also an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is DE-
incorporated and close to insolvency, and zero otherwise.8 Xit represents a vector of control 
variables. Industry FE denotes industry fixed effects, Year FE year fixed effects, and εit the 
residual. As in Becker and Strömberg (2012), we do not include a separate Afterlaw indicator as it 
 
7 To alleviate concerns about generalizability of the results documented using this sample, we note that the loan 
contracts were selected randomly (please refer to Appendix 2 for details). Furthermore, for all results on reporting 
conservatism reported in the paper which use this sample, we also conduct the same analyses using the entire 
Compustat universe (untabulated) since the variables used in reporting conservatism tests can be collected for all firms 
on Compustat. Our conclusions on reporting conservatism continue to hold in the general sample. 
8 Following Becker and Strömberg (2012), our main measure of proximity to insolvency is Merton’s distance-to-
default measure. Merton’s (1974) model uses the market value of a firm’s equity in calculating default risk. We 
construct the distance-to-default measure following Vassalou and Xing (2004), who employ Merton’s model to 
estimate the value of contingent claims on the firm’s assets. We classify firms with Merton measure below the median 
value in 1990 (i.e., immediately before the ruling) as being closer to insolvency.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376476
15 
 
is absorbed in the year fixed effects. In all our regressions, we cluster standard errors at the state 
of incorporation and year level, whenever possible.  
Our identification strategy benefits from the fact that the Credit Lyonnais ruling set a 
precedent for DE-incorporated firms but had no prejudicial power for other firms. The impact and 
scope of the ruling continue to be debated and interpreted in subsequent Delaware cases.9 Our 
identification draws the juristic distinction between DE-incorporated firms and non-DE-
incorporated firms. To the extent that other state jurisdictions may incorporate the results of 
Delaware rulings, this works against finding a significant treatment effect. 
 
Proxies for contracting and reporting conservatism  
Proxies for contracting conservatism 
We use three proxies for contracting conservatism: the use of income escalators, tangible 
net worth covenants (Beatty et al. 2008) and conservative definitions of net income, cash flows, or 
net worth (Li 2010). The typical income escalator clause stipulates changes to net worth 
calculations which incorporate future profits only partially and future losses in full. The first 
dependent variable, D(Escal), is an indicator variable equal to one if the net worth covenant 
includes an income escalator, and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable, D(Tang), is an 
indicator equal to one if the definition of net worth used in contracts includes only tangible assets, 
and zero otherwise. The third dependent variable, D(ConsDef), is an indicator equal to one if the 
definition of income, cash flow or net worth in a debt contract includes specific line items 
(e.g., extraordinary items) for losses but not for gains, and zero otherwise.  
 
9 Later rulings in Production Resources (2004) and Gheewalla (2007) introduced partial reversals of Credit Lyonnais 
by removing creditors’ ability to sue directors and officers for fiduciary duty breaches (Becker and Strömberg 2012). 
When we examine changes in both contracting and reporting conservatism following these rulings, we do not observe 
reversals of our main results. 




Proxies for reporting conservatism 
We also construct three proxies to examine changes in reporting conservatism following 
the Credit Lyonnais ruling: a composite conservatism score as used in Aier et al. (2014) (Crank), 
discretionary accruals, and negative special items. Crank is a composite measure of decile rankings 
of firm-year observations based on averages of three conservatism proxies (negative non-operating 
accruals, skewness of earnings vs. cash flows, and unrecorded balance sheet reserves). We use 
Crank to confirm Aier et al.’s (2014) finding in our sample of firms with loan contracts.  
To shed further light on how reporting conservatism might have changed, we examine two 
accounting choices made by managers: discretionary accruals (DA-DD) and special charges 
(SPI/AT). We use a discretionary accrual measure based on the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model, as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). We estimate the 
following model by industry-year using all available firm-years from Compustat/CRSP over our 
sample period 1989 to 1994, requiring at least 20 observations (industries are based on the Fama-
French 48 industries classification): 
TAit = α0 + α1CFOit−1 + α2CFOit + α3CFOit+1 + α4∆Revit+ α5PPEit+εit (2) 
 In equation (2), TAit is total accruals of firm i in year t (measured as earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operating cash flows (from continuing 
operations) taken directly from the statement of cash flows, scaled by average total assets). CFO 
is operating cash flow (measured as the sum of net income, depreciation and amortization, and 
changes in current liabilities, minus changes in current assets, scaled by average total assets); 
∆Revit is the annual change in revenues scaled by average total assets; and PPEit is property, plant, 
and equipment scaled by average total assets. The residuals from equation (2) represent 
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discretionary accruals not associated with operating cash flows that cannot be explained by change 
in revenue and level of PPE.  
We also examine income-decreasing special charges, such as impairments and 
restructurings.10 These special charges are a set of observable accounting accruals that directly 
communicate bad economic news to financial statement users. We examine the total (signed) 
amount of special items booked.11 
 
Control variables 
In the regressions examining contracting conservatism, we follow Beatty et al. (2008) and 
control for both contract-specific and firm-specific characteristics. For contract-specific controls, 
we include covenant intensity (number of financial covenants in the loan contract), loan maturity, 
loan size (scaled by lagged total assets), spread above LIBOR, and indicator variables for inclusion 
of performance pricing and for revolver loans. For firm-specific controls, we include firm size (log 
of market value of equity), firm performance (ROA and stock returns), credit rating, current 
accruals and growth rate in sales.  
In reporting conservatism regressions, we follow Aier et al. (2014) and control for firm 
size (log of market value of equity), firm performance (ROA and stock returns), firm leverage to 
capture change in financial risk, and institutional ownership as a proxy for governance quality. In 
addition, we consider changes in the real investment and financing decisions made by DE-
incorporated firms that Becker and Strömberg (2012) attribute to the Credit Lyonnais ruling. It is 
 
10 Prior to 2001, Compustat does not have fields relating separately to asset impairments and restructuring charges. 
Also, we do not examine extraordinary items separately because they are extremely rare. 
11 Mechanically, there might be some overlap between special items and our discretionary accrual measures. For 
example, if the special items include inventory impairments or the establishment of short-term reserves for 
restructuring liabilities, those transactions could be reflected in accruals. The correlation between the special items 
and negative accruals is around 0.35, suggesting that they are related but not redundant. 
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possible that these corporate changes drive changes in reporting behavior, as opposed to these 
reporting changes being directly affected by the legal ruling, per se. Controlling for these forces 
provides a clearer, and thus more causal, interpretation about how the change in fiduciary duty 
affects financial reporting. 
More specifically, the Delaware court ruling may affect corporate behavior (e.g., capital 
structure) and the risk profile of the company, which in turn may affect how the accounting system 
translates economic events to the financial statements. For example, Myers (1977) describes the 
debt overhang problem in which equity holders may be reluctant to raise new equity capital for 
positive NPV investments when most of the return on investment would go to creditors. Becker 
and Strömberg (2012) show that investment and equity issuance increase for firms affected by 
Credit Lyonnais, which they interpret as indicating a reduction in the debt overhang problem. To 
ensure any financial reporting effects we identify are not driven by the change in affected firms’ 
financing and investing behaviors, we control for investment and equity issuance. We measure 
investment by capital expenditure divided by total assets.12 Following Baker, Stein and Wurgler 
(2003), equity issuance is an indicator variable equal to one if stock issuance is positive, where 
stock issues are defined as the change in book equity minus changes in retained earnings adjusted 
for deferred taxes, normalized by lagged assets.  
A second concern is the risk substitution problem, in which equity holders may have 
incentives to increase the riskiness of existing assets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Becker and 
Strömberg (2012) find that performance volatilities decrease for firms affected by the court ruling, 
which they interpret as indicating a decline in the risk substitution problem. We therefore control 
 
12 We obtain very similar results when we further control for R&D/Assets. 
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for the change in risk profile of the company using equity volatility, which is calculated as the 
annualized monthly standard deviation of the stock return. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our loan contracts sample. Since there are few 
studies of loan contracts from early time periods before the widespread availability of machine-
readable filings (which started in 1994), we highlight comparisons with a more recent sample 
which is widely used in academic research (Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2009). 
Table 1, panel A shows the distribution of contracts by year of signing and DE vs. non-DE. 
Of the 278 contracts collected, 158 are by DE firms and 120 by non-DE firms. After reading all 
the contracts, we ascertain that 204 (73%) of these contracts contain net worth covenants. Panel B 
compares loan characteristics between our hand-collected sample (loans from 1989 to 1994) and 
the sample from Nini et al. (2009) (loans from 1996 to 2005).  
The comparison reveals several interesting patterns. First, our sample picks up smaller 
loans than Nini et al.’s (mean of $96 million compared to $450 million). Two factors contribute to 
this difference. (1) Nini et al.’s sample only includes contracts that contain a full table of contents 
according to their text search algorithm. Loans with a full table of contents tend to be larger (Nini 
et al. 2009). Our sample selection rules, however, do not contain such a bias. (2) The starting point 
for the Nini et al. sample is the Dealscan database from Loan Pricing Corporation, which has a 
focus on syndicated loans, whereas our procedure samples directly from companies’ regulatory 
filings regardless of the type of loan. Syndicated loans are usually larger as they involve multiple 
lenders supplying the funds for the loans. 
Loans from our sample period are much more likely to contain balance sheet covenants 
(net worth covenants are present in 73% of our sample) than those from later period covered by 
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the Nini et al. sample (45%). This pattern is consistent with the declining use of balance sheet 
covenants documented in Demerjian (2011). Income escalators constitute 37% of the net worth 
covenants in our sample. The corresponding proportion for income escalators for loans from the 
period 1994–2004 as reported in Beatty et al. (2008) is two-thirds, highlighting that the use of 
income escalators has increased significantly in later years. The net worth covenants stipulate the 
exclusion of intangible assets in 70% of the sample loans. Finally, we find conservative contractual 
definitions involving differential treatment of specific items of gains and losses (such as 
extraordinary items, gains from asset sales, and gains from asset write-up) in 34% of the contracts.  
Panel C of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the reporting conservatism variables. 
Panel D provides descriptive statistics of firm characteristics in the sample. All variables have 




Table 2, panel A presents univariate comparisons of contracting and reporting 
conservatism variables. We compare our dependent variables in the post-treatment period with 
those in the pre-treatment period for treatment group and control group separately. We then 
conduct a difference-in-difference test by comparing the difference in the treatment group with 
that in the control group. The difference-in-difference test shows a decrease in contracting 
conservatism following the ruling. All three proxies for contracting conservatism (D(Escal), 
D(Tang) and D(ConsDef)) exhibit significant declines relative to the control group following the 
ruling, with negative difference-in-difference values. This suggests that contracting parties rely 
less on contracting conservatism following a shift in fiduciary duties to creditors.  
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On the other hand, we observe an increase in reporting conservatism following the ruling. 
Crank increases following the ruling, whereas discretionary accruals and special items decrease 
following the ruling (although the latter is not statistically significant). These results support Aier 
et al.’s (2014) conclusion that, with additional legal exposure created by the ruling, managers are 
more willing to supply conservative reporting to meet lenders’ demand for conservatism (i.e., the 
“enforcement” problem diminishes).  
Taken together, our findings on contracting and reporting conservatism suggest a 
substitution of contracting conservatism by relatively less costly reporting conservatism as 
creditors gain more power. However, these univariate findings need to be explored in a 
multivariate setting before we can draw robust inferences. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents Pearson correlations amongst the contracting and accounting 
conservatism variables for the pooled sample of treated and untreated firms for all time periods. 
We note that the contracting conservatism measures have nearly zero correlation with one another. 
 
Regression results for contracting conservatism 
Table 3, panel A reports the results of our main analyses of contracting conservatism. We 
run logit regressions of the use of conservative loan modifications on an indicator variable for 
affected firms (DE-incorporated and in the zone of insolvency), an interaction term between 
Afterlaw and Affected, and control variables. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable taking the value one as follows, and zero otherwise: D(Escal): use of an income 
escalator in the contract; D(Tang): use of a tangible net worth covenant; and D(ConsDef): use of 
conservative definitions of cash flows, net income, or net worth in the loan contract. We find 
significantly lower use of income escalators, tangible net worth covenants, and conservative 
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definitions for affected firms after the ruling. This result suggests that, when there is an exogenous 
increase in fiduciary duties which favors creditors, contracting parties rely less on protection in the 
form of covenant modifications of GAAP numbers which introduce additional conservatism.13 
 To assess the sensitivity of our results to different control groups, we carry out two 
sensitivity tests. First, we repeat our analysis on a subsample of firms that are close to insolvency 
and compare firms that are DE-incorporated with those that are not. The benefit of this analysis is 
that any effect of firms’ distress risk can be more properly controlled. Panel B of Table 3 shows 
negative and significant coefficients in two out of three measures. Second, we re-run our analysis 
on a subsample of DE-incorporated firms and compare DE-incorporated firms that are close to 
insolvency with those that are not close to insolvency. This analysis is useful because it effectively 
controls for the potential confounding effect of states.  Panel C shows that we continue to obtain 
negative and significant results for D(Tang) and negative, albeit marginally insignificant, results 
for the other two measures. One possible reason is that the smaller sample size reduces statistical 
power of the tests. 
 
Regression results for reporting conservatism 
We now turn our attention to reporting conservatism in financial statements issued by firms 
before and after the ruling. In Table 4, the dependent variable is Crank (as per Aier et al. 2014), 
DA-DD (signed discretionary accruals from the Dechow-Dichev model) or SPI/AT (signed special 
items deflated by assets).  
Consistent with Aier et al.’s findings, we document in column (1) of panel A that Crank 
increases significantly after the ruling, indicating an overall increase in reporting conservatism. In 
 
13 We obtain similar results if we use OLS regressions. 
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column (2), the results suggest that there are significant reductions in discretionary accruals among 
affected firms, relative to control groups. Column (3) shows that the magnitude of special items is 
more negative for the affected firms. 
In panel B we analyze only close-to-default firms and our results continue to hold for Crank 
and DA-DD; the sign is negative for SPI/AT but the coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero. In panel C, we focus only on Delaware firms and find that all of our results hold when 
interacting the time and low distance-to-default indicator variable (Lowdist).  
Taken together, our results suggest that, with improved alignment between the board and 
creditors resulting from the Credit Lyonnais case, Delaware firms nearing financial distress (but 
not in bankruptcy) utilize less debt contracting conservatism (Table 3) and increase their financial 
reporting conservatism (Table 4). In the analyses that follow, we examine whether there is a direct 
substitution effect between the two approaches to implement conservatism. We also conduct cross-
sectional analyses to examine whether any substitution effect varies with ex-ante firm 
characteristics of the borrowers that reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two 
conservatism mechanisms.  
 
4. Additional analyses 
Direct test of substitution  
So far, we have examined the effect of the exogenous shock of the Credit Lyonnais ruling 
on each type of conservatism separately. To further understand the relation between the two types 
of conservatism, we now examine the interaction between these mechanisms. Since public filings 
are made every fiscal quarter whereas loan contracts (including new and amended ones) are written 
only when needed, we investigate whether contracting parties consider reporting conservatism 
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when deciding how contracting conservatism should change in response to the ruling. We expect 
the substitution to be more pronounced for firms that experience a greater increase in reporting 
conservatism after the ruling.  
 We create an indicator variable, D(Inc AccgCon), equal to one if a firm’s average reporting 
conservatism measure is below median in the pre-ruling period and above median in the post-
ruling period, and zero otherwise. We then interact D(Inc AccgCon) with the difference-in-
difference variable in model (1) and create a three-way interaction term Afterlaw × Affected × 
D(Inc AccgCon). We augment the contracting conservatism tests from Table 3 by adding the 
D(Inc AccgCon) indicator variable, the three-way interaction term and the associated double 
interaction terms. Dependent variables are the three proxies for contracting conservatism. We 
expect the three-way interaction term to be significantly negative. 
 Table 5 reports the results. We focus our discussion on panel A where Crank is the measure 
of reporting conservatism. Consistent with our expectation, the three-way interaction terms are 
negative across all proxies and are statistically significant for income escalator and tangible net 
worth. The results indicate that more conservative reporting choices are associated with greater 
reduction in contracting conservatism after the ruling. The tenor of the results does not change in 
panels B and C. The findings in Table 5 support the conjecture that contracting parties consider 




 In Hypothesis 2A and Hypothesis 2B, we predict that ex-ante business uncertainty and 
board independence would affect the relation between reporting conservatism and contracting 
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conservatism cross-sectionally following the ruling. We use equity volatility (log of annualized 
monthly standard deviation of stock returns, taken from CRSP) as a proxy for ex-ante business 
uncertainty. To facilitate interpretation, we divide the sample based on pre-event average equity 
volatility, split at the median. We measure Independent Board as an indicator variable taking value 
of one if the average proportion of independent board members during the pre-event period is 
above 50%, and zero otherwise. The cross-sectional tests follow the same approach as Table 5. 
We examine the triple interaction terms in the contracting conservatism regressions for two 
subsamples split by either ex-ante business uncertainty or board independence. Table 6 reports the 
results of the cross-sectional analyses. Panel A shows the effect of ex-ante uncertainty. We find 
that the substitution effect is concentrated in the subsample of firms with high ex-ante business 
uncertainty. This finding is consistent with hypothesis Hypothesis 2A and suggests that the higher 
ex-ante costs of writing contracts in high uncertainty firms move the contracting parties further 
away from using contracting conservatism following the ruling, which is possible because 
reporting conservatism is now less costly to enforce. Panel B shows the results for board 
independence. The substitution effect is concentrated in firms with more independent boards.  
 To summarize, the results in Tables 5 and 6 provide support for our main interpretation 
that, following the Credit Lyonnais ruling, whereby the court directed a stronger alignment 
between directors and creditors for Delaware firms near financial distress, there is a substitution 
of contracting conservatism by financial reporting conservatism in affected firms. 
 
5. Robustness analyses 
Causality 
Inferences from the difference-in-difference methodology rely on the assumption that, 
absent the treatment effect, both treated and control firms would have changed at the same rate 
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over time. To assess whether this is plausible, we test for a parallel trend prior to the treatment. 
We replace the Afterlaw indicator variable with four separate year-variables: Afterlaw(t = –1), 
Afterlaw(t = 0), Afterlaw(t = 1) and Afterlaw(t >= 2).14 As shown in Table 7, none of the pre-event 
variables are significant. This suggests that the parallel trend assumption is not violated. 
Furthermore, most of the differences in both contracting and reporting conservatism start to be 
significantly different from 1992 or, for some proxies, from 1993 onwards. 
The results also rule out reverse causality, in which the court ruling is an outcome of 
lobbying at the state of incorporation. If, for example, a broad coalition of DE-incorporated firms, 
all experiencing increases in reporting conservatism and decreases in contracting conservatism, 
successfully influenced the court decisions, then causality might be reversed. If this were the case, 
we should already see an effect of the court ruling prior to its passage (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2003; Armstrong, Balakrishnan and Cohen 2012). The absence of any significant pre-trend is 
evidence against reverse causality. 
The remaining robustness tests described below are untabulated for the sake of brevity. All 
of the results discussed are available from the authors upon request. 
 
Potential two-step bias when using residuals from a first-step regression as dependent variable 
in a second-step regression 
In column (2) of all panels in Table 4, and also in column (2) of panel B in Table 7, because 
the dependent variable DA-DD is the residual from a separate first-step regression, we 
acknowledge the possibility of a two-step bias as explained in Chen et al. (2018). Due to the small 
 
14 Afterlaw(t=-1) is a dummy equal to one if the court ruling will pass one year from now. Afterlaw(t=0) is a dummy 
equal to one if the court ruling passed this year, and Afterlaw(t=1) and Afterlaw(t>=2) are dummies equal to one if the 
court ruling passed one year ago and two or more years ago, respectively. 
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size of the samples involved in those analyses, we are unable to fully implement the Chen et al. 
(2018) adjustment because it requires the inclusion of first-step regressors as well as their 
interactions with the other variables in the model (see Chen et al. 2018, p. 774). Given our controls 
for industry and year fixed effects and samples with at most 221 observations, we do not have 
enough degrees of freedom to conduct the statistical tests. However, in order to alleviate concerns 
about the possible two-step bias, we also run the aforementioned regressions using the full 
Compustat sample (since those analyses do not require loan-related variables) and the full sample 
results, involving approximately 28,000 observations, are robust to the inclusion of first-step 
regressors. 
 
Changes in firms’ behavior post Credit Lyonnais 
Becker and Strömberg (2012) document changes in firms’ real decisions as a result of the 
Credit Lyonnais ruling, in particular, increase in investment and decrease in cash flow volatility 
for affected firms. In the main tests of reporting conservatism (Table 4), we control for capex 
(scaled by assets) and equity volatility to help alleviate concerns that changes in reporting 
conservatism may reflect these real decisions. To help address concerns that the effects on 
contracting conservatism may be driven by these real decisions, we also re-run the tests in Table 3 
with the inclusion of these two additional variables and our conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
Business cycle variation across geographic regions and industries 
The Credit Lyonnais court ruling passed in 1991, just after an economic recession in early 
1990. It is unlikely that our results are driven by an economic recession affecting DE firms 
disproportionately, given that the court ruling affected firms at the state of incorporation level 
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rather than the states in which they physically operate.15 However, to mitigate this concern, we use: 
(1) state of headquarters location × year joint fixed effects to capture the impact of variations in 
state-level business conditions, and (2) industry × year joint fixed effects to capture the impact of 
variations across industry groups on contracting and reporting conservatism. Our results continue 
to hold when these additional variables are included and thus are unlikely to be driven by variations 
in business cycle across industries or geographic regions. 
 
Alternative measures of insolvency 
 
Although we believe that the Merton-based distance-to-default measure represents a 
reasonable measure of insolvency risks because it incorporates investors’ expectations of future 
default risk (Vassalou and Xing 2004), we repeat our analyses using Altman’s Z-Score 
(Altman 1968) to capture near insolvency. Firms with a Z-Score below the median 1990 value are 
classified as being close to default. Using this alternative measure of insolvency risk, we obtain 
similar results for both contracting and reporting conservatism. 
 
Alternative clustering of standard errors 
 
 Following Becker and Strömberg (2012), we cluster the standard errors at the intersection 
of state of incorporation and year level. To assess the sensitivity of our results, we repeat our main 
tests using two-way clustering of standard errors at firm and year level. We continue to find similar 
results for both contracting and reporting conservatism. 
 
Firm fixed effects 
 
 
15 We are not aware of any research suggesting that DE firms as a group share any physical, geographic concentration 
within the U.S. that could have made them more or less susceptible to the recession than non-DE firms. 
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In our tests of Hypothesis 1, we have used logit specifications with industry fixed effects. 
We repeat the tests using firm fixed effects and OLS specifications for Hypothesis 1 and using 
firm fixed effects for Hypothesis 2A and Hypothesis 2B (in these specifications, the Affected main 
effects are dropped). The paper’s conclusions continue to hold if we use the alternative 
specifications with firm fixed effects.  
 
Regression by quartile of distance-to-default 
 
In our main specification, we simply partition the sample based on whether distance-to-
default is below or above the median. This binary cutoff is somewhat arbitrary and the likelihood 
that a firm considers itself close to distress may change in a more gradual fashion. We repeat the 
analysis by sorting firms into solvency quartiles. We run regressions which allow us to examine 
the gradual change in accounting or loan contracting choices as firms move towards insolvency, 
and we find that much of the effects documented in this paper are concentrated in the quartile of 
firms closest to financial distress, as we would expect.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We exploit an exogenous shift in the balance of power between creditors and owners to 
examine how contracting and reporting conservatism are affected by managerial fiduciary duties. 
A Delaware court ruling in the 1991 Credit Lyonnais case provides a natural experiment to 
examine this question. The ruling increased officers and directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors of 
firms that are solvent but are in the vicinity of insolvency. Prior to the ruling, it was held that 
management owes fiduciary duties to creditors only after the firm becomes insolvent. Hence, the 
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ruling shifted the balance of power in favor of creditors thereby mitigating the creditor-owner 
conflict. 
Adopting a difference-in-difference empirical design, we find that, following the ruling, 
debt contracts of affected firms rely less on the use of income escalators, tangible net worth 
covenants, and conservative definitions of net income, cash flows, or net worth (Table 3). We also 
find that affected firms have higher composite conservatism score, lower discretionary accruals, 
and report more negative special items following the ruling (Table 4). The results suggest a 
substitution of contracting conservatism by reporting conservatism following the ruling. When we 
further examine the interdependence between the two conservatism mechanisms, we find (Table 5) 
that the increased use of reporting conservatism is directly correlated with a lower usage of 
contracting conservatism. Moreover, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms with 
greater business uncertainty and more independent boards of directors (Table 6).  
We conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses for alternative explanations and our results are 
robust to these tests. Overall, our study demonstrates how a shift in the relative strengths of the 
duties owed by managers to creditors versus shareholders changes the nature of both financial 
reporting and debt contracting. 
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
D(Escal) Indicator variable equal to one if net worth covenant includes income escalator, zero otherwise.
D(Tang) Indicator variable equal to one if net worth covenant excludes intangible assets, zero otherwise.
D(ConsDef) 
Indicator variable equal to one if definition of income, cash flow or net worth in debt contract 
includes losses but not gains for specific line items (e.g., extraordinary items), zero otherwise.
Crank 
Composite measure of reporting conservatism from Aier et al. (2014). Higher values indicate 
more conservative financial reporting.
DA-DD 
Discretionary accruals estimated using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model for each year 
and each Fama-French 48 industry with at least 20 observations. Total accruals are regressed 
on current, lead and lagged operating cash flows, change in revenue and PPE. Discretionary 
accruals are residuals from the regressions.
SPI/AT Special charges (Compustat data item 17) scaled by total assets (item 6). 
Afterlaw Indicator variable equal to one if year>1991, zero otherwise.
Affected 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm is incorporated in Delaware and close to insolvency 
(distance-to-default is below median in 1990), zero otherwise.
Cov Intensity Number of financial covenants.
Maturity Maturity of loans in years.
Loan/Assets Loan amount over total assets (item 6).
Ppricing 
Indicator variable equal to one if performance pricing is included in loan contract, zero 
otherwise. 
Revolver 
Indicator variable equal to one if loan agreement contains a line of credit/revolver, zero 
otherwise. 
Spread The interest rate spread over LIBOR for loans without performance pricing. 
Rating 
For firms with available credit rating, the debt rating (coded numerically from 1 (AAA) to 24 
(C)) is regressed on total assets, ROA, debt to assets, and indicator variables for presence of 
subordinated debt, divided, and loss The coefficient estimates are then used to generate credit 
ratings for all firm-years. 
ROA Log of one plus net income (item 18) over lagged total assets (item 6). 
Stock Return Log of one plus stock return over past 12 months.
Sales Growth Change in sales over lagged sales (item 12).
Firm Size Log of total assets (item 6).
Curr Accrual 
Absolute value of current accruals, calculated as changes in account receivables (item 302), 
inventory (item 303), accounts payables and accrued liabilities (item 304), and accrued income 
taxes (item 305), all over total assets (item 6).
Firm Leverage Short term debt (item 34) + long term debt (item 9) - cash (item 1), all over total assets (item 6).
Capx/Asset Capital expenditure (item 128) over total assets (item 6).
D(Issue Equity) 
Indicator variable equal to one for positive stock issuance (calculated as change in common 
equity plus change in deferred tax minus change in retained earnings, all scaled by total assets), 
zero otherwise (Baker, Stein and Wurgler 2003).
Equity Volatility Log of annualized monthly standard deviation of stock returns, from CRSP. 
IO Percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutions.
Delaware Indicator variable equal to one if firm is incorporated in Delaware, zero otherwise. 
Lowdist 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm is close to insolvency (distance-to-default below median 
in 1990), zero otherwise.
D(Inc AccgCon) 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm’s average reporting conservatism measure is below 
median before passage of court ruling and above median in post-ruling period, zero otherwise.
Afterlaw(t=−1) Indicator variable equal to one if one year before passage of court ruling, zero otherwise.
Afterlaw(t=0) Indicator variable equal to one for the year during which court ruling passes, zero otherwise.
Afterlaw(t=1) Indicator variable equal to one if one year after passage of ruling, zero otherwise. 
Afterlaw(t>=2) 
Indicator variable equal to one if two or more years after passage of court ruling, zero 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 2. Procedures for collection of loan sample data 
Since there are no readily available machine-readable data on loan contracts for the time 
period in our study, we conduct our loan choice analysis on a small, hand-collected sample. 
We retrieve loan contracts filed by companies with the SEC. Under SEC Regulation S-K, 
item 601 (b), public firms are required to include all material contracts as exhibits in their filings. 
Most loan contracts can be found in Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K and registration statements, and they 
are typically attached as exhibit item 4 and/or item 10. Because the time period we study is before 
the mandatory implementation of electronic filings on the SEC’s EDGAR system, we manually 
search microfiche records of firms’ filings from Q-File to locate loan contracts. After identifying 
the location of loan contracts from the microfiche records, the next step is to purchase the exhibits 
from commercial data providers because most microfiche records only contain the main filings 
and do not include exhibits. Due to the high cost of data collection, we adopt a random sampling 
strategy to construct the credit agreement sample. The procedure is as follows: 
(1) We focus on firms in our base dataset which have debt to total assets ratio 
((dlc + dltt) / at) of 10% or more. According to Item 601(b) (4) of Regulation S-K, firms are 
required to file long-term debt instruments only when the debt amount exceeds 10% of total assets. 
This step ensures that the firms we select have a good chance of having “material” debt contracts 
that need to be disclosed as exhibits. 
(2) For each year, we categorize firms into two groups, Delaware and non-Delaware, and 
randomly select 150 firms from each year and each group.16 We locate and read the microfiche 
records for these firms from Q-File. Q-File provides index books containing firm names and filing 
 
16 The distribution of public firms on Compustat between DE and non-DE incorporation is approximately half-half, 
which is similar to the proportions reported in Daines (2001). 
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types. Firms are alphabetically ordered by name. We manually match our random sample with the 
index book by company name and verify our matches using the EIN numbers from both sources.17 
To make our hand collection work manageable, we only run this random selection procedure four 
times from years 1991 to 1994, and we read the exhibit list of the selected companies’ 10-K 
reports.18 In each 10-K exhibit list, we search for credit agreements that were initiated three years 
before (1989 – 1991) and three years after (1992 – 1994) the Credit Lyonnais ruling. Following 
Beatty, Cheng and Zach (2019), our search looks for key words related to “credit”, “loan” or 
“financing” in the exhibit list.19 If a loan was initiated within the year of the 10-K, the loan contract 
can usually be immediately located in the 10-K using the exhibit number. If a loan was initiated 
prior to the year of the 10-K, the 10-K exhibit list references the type, date and the exhibit number 
of the original filing where the actual copy of the loan was filed. The original filing could be of 
any form, such as 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K and registration statements. 
(3) Since Q-File keeps only the main body of filings but not exhibits, we record the location 
(filing type, date and exhibit number) of the actual copies of the loan contracts and purchase those 
copies from commercial data providers. 
(4) Finally, we read through each loan contract and manually code the variables of interest. 
 
17 When matching by name, we consider both current and historical names of a company.  
18 This simplified approach focusing on 10-Ks is likely to have an innocuous impact on our sample selection for the 
following reasons: Compared to other filing types, a 10-K report has the most comprehensive exhibit list. All material 
loan contracts of a company as of the fiscal year-end will be disclosed in the 10-K exhibit list. The 10-K report 
constitutes a reasonable starting point for our search since it includes loans initiated within the year of the 10-K as 
well as references to loans initiated in the prior periods back to their original filings. Thus, from a company’s 10-K 
exhibit list, we are able to track down the filing where loans were originally filed. 
19 For example, a credit agreement can be called “credit agreement”, “loan agreement”, “credit facility”, “loan and 
security agreement”, “loan & security agreement”, “revolving credit”, “financing and security agreement”, “financing 
& security agreement”, “credit and guarantee agreement”, “credit & guarantee agreement”, “credit and security 
agreement” or “credit & security agreement”.  
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Through the above search procedure steps (1) to (3), we identify 333 exhibit items that are 
likely to be credit agreements. We are able to find 310 copies of exhibits from commercial data 
providers (23 cases cannot be found for various reasons, including cases where the filings refer to 
an exhibit that seemingly was never filed with the SEC). For the 310 exhibit copies, we further 
eliminate 28 copies (3 cases are promissory notes or loan commitment letters without covenant 
details; 2 cases are guaranty or security agreements only; 3 cases are minor amendments or 
incomplete contracts; 16 cases are bond contracts; and 4 cases are unreadable due to low quality 
of the microfiche copies). After further requiring availability of control variable values when 
conducting regressions, our final credit agreement sample consists of 278 loan contracts that were 
initiated in a six-year window around the Credit Lyonnais ruling.20 
  
 
20 Only a few studies have examined private loan agreements before 1996 (when electronic filings became mandatory). 
Leftwich (1983) reviews 10 loan agreements from before 1977, Beneish and Press (1993) investigate 96 loan contracts 
or amendments from 1983 to 1987, and Beatty, Ramesh and Weber (2002) study 285 credit agreements that are 
searchable through Lexis-Nexis during 1994 to 1996 (when electronic filings were sparsely available).  
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive statistics 
  
Panel A: Distribution of the loan contracts sample
All credit agreements:  
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
  Delaware 15 28 32 25 35 23 158
  Non-Delaware 21 18 24 20 22 15 120
  Total 36 46 56 45 57 38 278
Credit agreements with net worth covenant:   
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total
  Delaware 10 22 25 19 27 15 118
  Non-Delaware 16 14 17 13 17 9 86
  Total 26 36 42 32 44 24 204
Panel B: Loan characteristics 
 Our sample Nini et al. (2009) sample
  Mean Median N Mean Median N
Loan amount (in $ millions) 96.175 25.000 278 450.0 200.0 3,720
Loan size (amount/total assets) 0.342 0.171 278 0.338 0.245 3,720
Spread (%) 1.061 0.750 278 1.700 1.500 3,720
Secured 0.633 1.000 278 0.647 1.000 3,117
Has a line of credit/revolver 0.770 1.000 278 0.938 1.000 3,720
Maturity 3.290 3.000 278   
Has performance pricing 0.227 0.000 278   
   
Financial Covenants   
  Number of financial covenants 3.320 3.000 278 2.336 2.000 3,603
  Any net worth covenants 0.734 1.000 278 0.452 0.000 3,603
   
Contracting Conservatism Variables   
  Income escalator 0.373 0.000 204   
  Intangible asset exclusion 0.696 1.000 204   
  Conservatively defined income, cash flow, 
    or net worth 0.342 0.000 278     
Panel C: Reporting conservatism variables 
 N Mean Median SD P25 P75 
Crank 222 5.519 5.667 1.166 5.000 6.333 
DA-DD 221 0.006 0.009 0.076 -0.043 0.045 
SPI/AT 242 −0.008 0.000 0.030 −0.002 0.000 
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
 N Mean Median SD P25 P75 
ROA 278 0.019 0.031 0.080 0.000 0.062 
Stock Return 278 0.064 0.079 0.541 −0.267 0.384 
Sales Growth 278 0.162 0.125 0.263 0.008 0.246 
Firm Size 278 5.072 5.034 1.593 3.987 5.967 
Curr Accrual 278 0.049 0.031 0.055 0.011 0.064 
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 6000–6999 and 
sic 4000–4999). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 2  
Univariate analysis 
 
Panel A: Comparison of treatment and control groups 
  Treatment group Control group Diff-in-diff
 N Before After p-value N Before After p-value Diff-in-diff p-value
D(Escal) 49 0.219 0.118 0.395 155 0.340 0.600 0.002 −0.361 0.024
D(Tang) 49 0.750 0.235 0.000 155 0.780 0.655 0.091 −0.389 0.011
D(ConsDef) 59 0.568 0.227 0.010 219 0.305 0.333 0.667 −0.369 0.010
Crank 48 5.244 6.462 0.001 174 5.403 5.561 0.381 1.060 0.006
DA-DD 41 0.011 −0.057 0.018 180 0.006 0.009 0.781 −0.072 0.033
SPI/AT 53 −0.006 −0.013 0.496 189 −0.007 −0.008 0.661 −0.005 0.604
 
Panel B: Correlation table 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
[1] D(Escal) 1.00  
[2] D(Tang) 0.02 1.00  
[3] D(ConsDef) 0.05 −0.03 1.00  
[4] Crank −0.14* −0.11 0.15** 1.00  
[5] DA-DD −0.03 0.20** −0.05 −0.13* 1.00  
[6] SPI/AT 0.17** 0.07 −0.10 −0.03 0.35*** 1.00 
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. We exclude financial and utility industries (sic 6000–6999 and sic 4000–4999). The treatment group consists of firms 
that are incorporated in Delaware and are close to insolvency. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. 
 
E





TABLE 3  
Contracting conservatism 
 
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Only close-to-default firms Panel C: Only Delaware firms
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 D(Escal) D(Tang) D(ConsDef) D(Escal) D(Tang) D(ConsDef) D(Escal) D(Tang) D(ConsDef) 
         
Afterlaw*Affected −1.428 −3.721 −2.086 Afterlaw*Delaware −3.179 1.520 −5.019 Afterlaw*Lowdist −1.649 −4.476 −1.487 
 (−2.55)** (−4.05)*** (−1.73)* (−1.96)** (0.53) (−2.88)*** (−1.39) (−3.56)*** (−1.61) 
Affected −1.051 −0.028 0.807 Delaware −2.017 −3.541 1.773 Lowdist −1.349 −0.624 1.122 
 (−3.60)*** (−0.05) (3.00)*** (−1.84)* (−1.50) (1.74)* (−1.74)* (−0.55) (1.73)* 
Cov Intensity 0.449 0.328 0.482 Cov Intensity 0.641 1.404 0.784 Cov Intensity 0.538 0.849 0.548 
 (3.26)*** (2.32)** (4.83)*** (1.54) (1.85)* (3.29)*** (2.61)*** (2.15)** (2.96)*** 
Maturity 0.156 −0.217 −0.005 Maturity 0.490 2.987 0.092 Maturity 0.085 −0.785 0.035 
 (1.83)* (−1.71)* (−0.06) (1.85)* (1.20) (0.54) (0.45) (−1.89)* (0.26) 
Loan/Assets 0.018 −0.714 0.364 Loan/Assets 3.074 −5.614 −0.839 Loan/Assets 0.563 −0.934 0.674 
 (0.09) (−4.73)*** (1.72)* (2.48)** (−1.15) (−0.45) (1.79)* (−2.41)** (2.73)*** 
Ppricing 0.178 0.176 0.467 Ppricing −0.160 3.148 0.497 Ppricing 0.970 0.628 1.273 
 (0.32) (0.25) (1.15) (−0.14) (0.74) (0.52) (1.09) (0.68) (1.87)* 
Revolver −0.793 −0.054 −0.306 Revolver −2.250 10.896 0.369 Revolver −0.731 −0.080 −1.424 
 (−1.44) (−0.10) (−0.85) (−1.90)* (1.12) (0.46) (−0.84) (−0.07) (−1.90)* 
Spread 0.072 0.153 0.109 Spread 0.101 −1.883 −0.842 Spread 0.579 0.135 −0.166 
 (0.45) (1.05) (0.64) (0.33) (−1.23) (−2.36)** (1.33) (0.69) (−0.65) 
Rating 0.145 −0.127 −0.040 Rating 0.625 −1.296 −0.027 Rating 0.335 0.080 0.004 
 (1.51) (−1.58) (−0.47) (1.60) (−1.34) (−0.16) (2.23)** (0.57) (0.03) 
ROA 4.524 2.453 4.750 ROA −17.860 52.140 −1.254 ROA 28.938 7.448 2.665 
 (1.08) (0.89) (1.46) (−1.91)* (3.38)*** (−0.40) (3.36)*** (1.03) (0.58) 
Stock Return 0.894 0.545 0.122 Stock Return 4.046 −5.226 0.965 Stock Return 0.701 0.302 1.483 
 (1.40) (0.85) (0.26) (2.90)*** (−2.79)*** (1.17) (0.89) (0.31) (2.14)** 
Sales Growth 0.498 −1.555 −1.108 Sales Growth 0.828 0.352 −0.950 Sales Growth −0.640 −1.471 −3.481 
 (0.57) (−1.86)* (−1.46) (0.42) (0.05) (−0.84) (−0.51) (−0.88) (−2.77)*** 
Firm Size 0.319 −0.436 0.342 Firm Size 0.236 −7.935 0.228 Firm Size 0.826 −0.392 0.089 
 (1.57) (−2.64)*** (3.10)*** (0.56) (−1.49) (0.79) (2.72)*** (−1.04) (0.47) 
Curr Accrual −5.014 11.528 2.330 Curr Accrual −9.759 44.367 2.552 Curr Accrual −1.039 −6.092 2.270 
 (−1.04) (1.86)* (0.70) (−1.44) (1.92)* (0.35) (−0.14) (−0.35) (0.39)     
Observations 204 204 278 Observations 96 96 119 Observations 118 118 158 
R-squared 0.257 0.323 0.234 R-squared 0.481 0.772 0.384 R-squared 0.435 0.548 0.358 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
The sample consists of 278 randomly selected loan contracts from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the logit regressions but are not 
reported. z-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of the state of incorporation and year level, except for panel C which is for only one state, and therefore robust standard errors are 
presented instead. In panel B, close-to-default firms are those with below median distance-to-default, measured in 1990. Bold text indicates variable of interest. 
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TABLE 4  
Reporting conservatism 
  
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Only close-to-default firms Panel C: Only Delaware firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
 Crank DA-DD SPI/AT Crank DA-DD SPI/AT Crank DA-DD SPI/AT
       
Afterlaw*Affected 0.884 −0.039 −0.015 Afterlaw*Delaware 1.464 −0.080 −0.010 Afterlaw*Lowdist 1.034 −0.054 −0.014 
 (1.96)* (−2.09)** (−2.03)** (2.57)** (−1.95)* (−0.78) (2.40)** (−2.04)** (−2.50)** 
Affected −0.005 0.015 0.007 Delaware 0.212 0.003 0.001 Lowdist −0.033 0.007 0.007
 (−0.02) (2.10)** (1.52) (0.51) (0.19) (0.11) (−0.09) (0.32) (1.65)
ROA 2.341 0.407 0.209 ROA −5.197 0.338 0.335 ROA −0.016 0.340 0.391
 (1.74)* (5.76)*** (2.48)** (−2.60)** (3.13)*** (3.16)*** (−0.01) (2.51)** (6.08)*** 
Stock Return 0.143 −0.000 0.002 Stock Return 0.921 0.008 −0.004 Stock Return 0.412 0.004 −0.005
 (0.91) (−0.03) (0.44) (3.13)*** (0.59) (−0.55) (1.84)* (0.21) (−1.52)
Firm Size 0.065 −0.012 −0.001 Firm Size −0.307 −0.012 −0.001 Firm Size −0.040 −0.014 0.000
 (1.06) (−3.18)*** (−1.22) (−2.73)*** (−1.53) (−0.31) (−0.47) (−2.80)*** (0.25)
Firm Leverage −1.412 0.060 0.013 Firm Leverage 0.699 0.001 0.047 Firm Leverage −1.348 0.059 0.003
 (−3.85)*** (2.11)** (1.44) (0.62) (0.02) (2.86)*** (−2.41)** (1.25) (0.37)
Capx/Asset −0.136 −0.093 0.004 Capx/Asset 3.770 0.137 −0.045 Capx/Asset 0.201 −0.124 0.026
 (−0.15) (−1.79)* (0.37) (1.05) (1.28) (−0.66) (0.23) (−1.32) (1.65)
D(Issue Equity) −0.140 −0.010 0.003 D(Issue Equity) −0.409 0.002 0.004 D(Issue Equity) −0.370 −0.019 −0.005
 (−0.82) (−0.58) (0.78) (−1.22) (0.12) (0.60) (−1.60) (−1.05) (−1.29)
Equity Volatility 0.049 −0.007 −0.002 Equity Volatility −0.057 −0.014 −0.001 Equity Volatility −0.190 −0.015 0.007
 (0.25) (−0.64) (−0.35) (−0.13) (−0.46) (−0.20) (−0.68) (−0.92) (1.87)*
IO 0.339 0.046 −0.029 IO 2.038 0.063 −0.017 IO 0.840 0.023 −0.025
 (0.75) (1.41) (−2.84)*** (2.39)** (1.45) (−1.21) (1.40) (0.54) (−2.76)***     
Observations 222 221 242 Observations 100 94 105 Observations 123 116 138
R-squared 0.316 0.333 0.403 R-squared 0.521 0.559 0.637 R-squared 0.356 0.388 0.636
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics are presented 
beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are 
clustered by the interaction of state of incorporation and year, except for panel C which is for only one state, and therefore robust standard errors are presented instead. In panel B, 
close-to-default firms are those with below median distance-to-default, measured in 1990. Bold text indicates variable of interest. 
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Interaction between contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism 
 




















    
Afterlaw*Affected 0.074 0.147 −0.183 −0.004 0.127 −0.136 0.003 −0.651 −0.283
 (0.39) (0.81) (−1.04) (−0.02) (0.91) (−0.92) (0.02) (−5.69)*** (−1.67)*
Afterlaw*Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −0.661 −0.899 −0.212 0.096 −0.520 −0.476 −0.672 0.253 −0.561
 (−1.85)* (−3.62)*** (−0.91) (0.27) (−2.10)** (−1.90)* (−2.61)** (0.82) (−2.17)**
Affected −0.126 0.066 0.087 −0.140 0.027 0.144 −0.151 0.084 0.152
 (−1.73)* (0.68) (1.51) (−2.14)** (0.38) (2.78)*** (−2.51)** (0.93) (1.98)*
D(Inc AccgCon) −0.098 0.143 −0.167 −0.437 0.329 0.760 0.637 0.139 −0.014
 (−0.66) (1.65) (−2.00)** (−3.74)*** (3.35)*** (10.82)*** (4.78)*** (1.31) (−0.11)
Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −0.030 −0.303 0.267 0.188 −0.713 −0.423 −0.002 −0.448 −0.018
 (−0.15) (−1.81)* (1.96)* (0.87) (−3.06)*** (−1.84)* (−0.01) (−1.85)* (−0.08)
Afterlaw*D(Inc AccgCon) 0.471 0.131 −0.020 −0.173 0.001 −0.015 −0.175 −0.146 0.065
 (2.08)** (1.01) (−0.12) (−1.09) (0.00) (−0.15) (−1.05) (−0.93) (0.38)  
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204 204 278 204 204 278 204 204 278
R-squared 0.325 0.424 0.290 0.337 0.425 0.334 0.481 0.363 0.281
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms and control variables as in Table 3 are included in the regressions 
but are not reported. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of state of incorporation and year. Bold text indicates variable of interest. 
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TABLE 6  
Cross-sectional analyses 
 
Panel A: Effect of ex-ante uncertainty 














   
Afterlaw*Affected 0.641 0.443 0.091 −0.672 −0.305 −0.359
 (2.16)** (1.80)* (0.25) (−1.88)* (−1.05) (−1.14)
Afterlaw*Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −1.090 −1.335 −0.083 −0.235 −0.290 −0.480 
 (−2.28)** (−6.52)*** (−0.20) (−0.49) (−0.67) (−0.96) 
Affected −0.131 −0.100 −0.027 −0.012 0.204 0.094
 (−1.11) (−0.98) (−0.18) (−0.06) (1.04) (0.46)
D(Inc AccgCon) −0.254 −0.096 −0.212 −0.146 0.095 −0.237
 (−1.33) (−0.66) (−1.82)* (−0.85) (0.76) (−1.51)
Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −0.176 0.175 0.335 0.054 −0.779 0.307
 (−0.57) (1.23) (1.83)* (0.16) (−2.17)** (0.92)
Afterlaw*D(Inc AccgCon) 0.642 0.317 −0.212 0.602 0.229 0.250
 (2.02)** (1.47) (−1.02) (2.72)*** (1.18) (0.85)
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 96 96 134 108 108 144
R-squared 0.519 0.569 0.437 0.450 0.533 0.293
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of equality of coefficient on Afterlaw*Affected*D(Inc AccgCon), high vs. low equity volatility: 









TABLE 6  
Cross-sectional analyses (continued) 
 
Panel B: Effect of board independence 














   
Afterlaw*Affected 0.232 0.383 −0.136 −0.123 −0.821 −0.444
 (0.72) (1.64) (−0.50) (−0.65) (−0.95) (−1.18)
Afterlaw*Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −1.023 −0.612 −0.724 −0.077 −0.562 −0.039 
 (−2.11)** (−1.69)* (−1.71)* (−0.42) (−0.73) (−0.08) 
Affected −0.207 −0.056 0.076 −0.312 −0.420 0.370
 (−2.46)** (−0.46) (0.66) (−2.80)** (−1.49) (1.44)
D(Inc AccgCon) −0.131 −0.042 −0.046 −0.322 0.002 0.006
 (−0.62) (−0.26) (−0.26) (−2.96)** (0.01) (0.03)
Affected*D(Inc AccgCon) −0.250 −0.561 0.055 −0.009 0.866 0.239
 (−0.99) (−1.79)* (0.16) (−0.05) (1.66) (0.55)
Afterlaw*D(Inc AccgCon) 1.073 0.179 0.421 −0.258 0.020 0.127
 (3.55)*** (0.71) (1.45) (−1.59) (0.05) (0.36)
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110 110 145 39 39 59
R-squared 0.476 0.586 0.348 0.994 0.912 0.755
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of equality of coefficient on Afterlaw*Affected*D(Inc AccgCon), independent vs. not independent board:
p-value 0.038 0.920 0.193   
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. In panel A, the sample is divided based on pre-event average equity volatility, 
split at the median. In panel B, the sample is divided based on whether the firm had a majority independent board in the pre-event period. Intercept terms and 
control variables as in Table 3 are included in the regressions but are not reported. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the interaction of state of 
incorporation and year. Bold text indicates variable of interest.  
E





TABLE 7  
Parallel trend 
 
  Panel A: Contracting conservatism  Panel B: Reporting conservatism 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
 D(Escal) D(Tang) D(ConsDef) Crank DA-DD SPI/AT
   
Afterlaw(t = –1)*Affected −0.129 0.145 0.088 0.569 0.009 −0.005
 (−1.07) (1.06) (1.01) (1.39) (0.62) (−0.74)
Afterlaw(t = 0)*Affected 0.010 −0.041 −0.010 −1.003 0.015 0.007 
 (0.06) (−0.30) (−0.09) (−3.68)*** (0.64) (0.78) 
Afterlaw(t = 1)*Affected −0.240 −0.510 −0.566 0.142 −0.030 −0.025 
 (−1.75)* (−3.07)*** (−5.03)*** (0.50) (−1.10) (−2.81)*** 
Afterlaw(t >= 2)*Affected −0.274 −0.545 −0.127 1.406 −0.033 −0.007 
 (−2.21)** (−3.87)*** (−1.00) (6.27)*** (−1.72)* (−0.78) 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204 204 278 222 221 242
R-squared 0.299 0.374 0.274 0.352 0.334 0.411
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
The sample period is from 1989 to 1994. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Intercept terms are included in the regressions but are not reported. Panel A 
includes all control variables as in Table 3 and panel B includes all control variables as in Table 4. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by the 
interaction of state of incorporation and year. Bold text indicates variables of interest. 
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